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Being and Goodness, DAVID S. ODERBERG 
 
The article defends the scholastic principle of the convertibility of being and 
goodness. First, it identifies the non-moral sense of ‘good’ as the fulfilment of 
appetite, where appetites are the natural tendencies of objects, whether living or 
non-living, to or away from certain end states. The good, in its primary meaning, 
applies to all cases in which some appetite is fulfilled. The article then analyses a 
central case of inorganic fulfilment, centred on the idea of instantiation – in particular, 
being a good example of some geometrical kind. It argues that the goodness in a 
case of instantiation, where there is a standard to be met, is an irreducible kind of 
goodness. Next, the article argues that continuation in existence is also a kind of 
fulfilment of appetite possessed by all enduring things. The primary counterexample 
involves radioactive decay: the article deflects this counterexample by showing that it 
does not undermine the idea that every enduring object has a tendency to continue 
in existence. Once we appreciate the place of appetite fulfilment across the natural 
world, we are more easily able to understand organic fulfilment – goodness for a 
thing. Without a kind-neutral concept of goodness that applies to all being, organic 
goodness is far more difficult to account for. – Correspondence to: 
d.s.oderberg@reading.ac.uk. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The old scholastic principle of the ‘convertibility’ of being and goodness strikes 
nearly all moderns as either barely comprehensible or plain false. ‘Convertible’ is a term of 
art meaning ‘interchangeable’ in respect of predication, where the predicates can be 
exchanged salva veritate albeit not salva sensu: their referents are, as the maxim goes, really 
the same albeit conceptually different.
1
 
The principle seems at first blush absurd. Did the scholastics literally mean that 
every being is good? Is that supposed to include a cancer, a malaria parasite, an earthquake 
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2 
that kills millions? If every being is good, then no being is bad – but how can that be? To the 
contemporary philosophical mind, such bafflement is understandable. It derives from the 
systematic dismantling of the great scholastic edifice that took place over half a millennium. 
With the loss of the basic concepts out of which that edifice was built, the space created by 
those concepts faded out of existence as well. The convertibility principle, like virtually all 
the other scholastic principles (not all, since some do survive and thrive in analytic 
philosophy), could not persist in a post-scholastic space wholly alien to it. 
Nevertheless, the convertibility principle can be defended. Not only is it meaningful 
when rightly understood, but it is eminently plausible. In what follows I will outline how that 
defence should proceed. 
 
2. THE GOOD IN THE REAL: APPETITES AND FULFILMENT 
The defence must begin with a fundamental non-moral sense of ‘good’. This 
immediately deflects the confusion that somehow the principle is that every being is morally 
good, or has moral worth or value. Now there is nothing unusual in the thought that there is a 
non-moral sense of ‘good’, moreover one in terms of which the moral sense of ‘good’ can be 
explained. Consequentialists analyse rightness (and wrongness) in terms of whether an action 
promotes, directly or indirectly, good outcomes or states of affairs. Ethical egoism holds that 
the rightness of a person’s acts is defined in terms of the promotion of what is good for that 
person. There are many non-moral senses of ‘good’, two of the main ones being ‘pleasurable’ 
and ‘useful’. There is, however, another sense of ‘good’, one that is the core of the 
convertibility principle. It is captured by the idea of perfection, where this term is taken in its 
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3 
etymological sense of ‘completion’ or ‘fulfilment’, with correlative connotations such as 
‘improve’ or ‘bring to the highest available standard’. 
The idea that the primary sense of ‘good’ and ‘goodness’ essentially involves 
perfection as a kind of completion or fulfilment was a commonplace among scholastic 
philosophers and their neo-scholastic representatives.
2
 We find, of course, liberal use of the 
term ‘perfection’ in Descartes, where he applies it not just to God as a whole but to His 
particular properties, and not just to God but to creatures as well.
3
 Where Descartes asserted 
that existence is a perfection, contemporary philosophers follow Kant in denying that 
existence is a property or predicate.
4
 The older usage, precariously preserved into the early 
modern period, sees perfection as what used to be called an increase in the fullness of  being, 
a bringing to fulfilment or completion of some disposition, power, or tendency of an object – 
in scholastic terminology, the actualization of some potentiality (or potency) of a thing.
5
 And 
this, at least according to the scholastics, albeit less clearly in Aristotle himself, is precisely 
what they called good in the broadest, fundamental sense. 
Before mystification sets in immediately, further distinctions have to be made. By 
completion I do not mean that an object has all the features it could have, or performs all the 
operations it could perform. A person might say, ‘Having visited Niagara Falls, my life is 
complete’, meaning he has no more significant desires to satisfy; but mostly when we talk 
about completion we refer to quite specific tasks, like completing a test or cleaning the 
kitchen. It is this narrow sense I have in mind – that an object is completed when one of its 
potencies is actualized, say by manifesting a disposition. 
Next, by fulfilment I do not mean any connotation of subjective desire, sense of 
happiness or well being, or anything essentially to do with uses such as ‘Now we are married 
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I feel fulfilled’ or ‘Getting that job fulfilled her heart’s desire’, and the like. For such senses 
of fulfilment I will use the rare but extant term ‘epithymetic’, meaning (at least partly by 
hijack) ‘characterized by subjective desire (longing, yearning, and so on)’. When it comes to 
humans and some animals, of course, epithymetic fulfilment is an important part of fulfilment 
simpliciter. But fulfilment simpliciter (just plain fulfilment) is my concern in this lecture, and 
it does not – so I claim – have epithymetic fulfilment as an essential constituent; nor does it 
have cognition or awareness of any kind as essential elements.  
With that understood, I will use the term ‘appetite’ in connection with fulfilment. 
Understood classically, appetites are simply tendencies or dispositions of objects to or away 
from certain end states.
6
 Aquinas, for example, speaks of objects that have no knowledge but 
still have a ‘natural appetite’ whereby they ‘tend’ or are ‘inclined’ to certain ends.7 Only 
certain kinds of appetite – sensitive and rational, as the scholastic terminology has it – 
involve cognition or at least some kind of apprehension. The fulfilment of a natural appetite, 
that is, a disposition or tendency in the nature of an object, does not entail any striving, 
trying, wanting, or anything else that comes under the general term ‘conation’. Particles of 
opposite charges attract; salt dissolves in water; snowflakes tend to grow six branches; stars 
burn out: these are all examples of natural appetites – tendencies of objects to certain kinds of 
behaviour. More precisely, as is usually suggested by the wording, we can describe the 
tendency itself or what the tendency results in, or both. A proton has the tendency to attract 
electrons even in the absence of electrons. When it is attracting an electron, it is exercising its 
tendency, or manifesting its disposition – to use the more familiar expression. To say that salt 
dissolves in water is to speak ambiguously of what salt tends to do whether it is in water or 
not and of what it actually does in water, which is the manifested end state of the disposition. 
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It makes no sense to speak of a disposition or tendency without a corresponding 
manifestation or end state. Note that the end state – or final state, as I will sometimes say – 
need not be something static, such as the presence of some chemical or the occurrence of 
some temperature. It might be an event or a process, such as dissolution. 
 
3. THE GOOD IN THE REAL: INSTANTIATION 
With all of this terminological and conceptual stage-setting in place, I want to bring 
into focus the central claim – that the good, in its primary meaning, applies to all cases in 
which some appetite is fulfilled. The corollary of this truth is that everything that is real is 
good, since everything that is real involves the fulfilment of an appetite. More precisely, a 
thing is good to the extent that it involves fulfilment of an appetite, and because of this. 
The idea that good can somehow creep in here seems at first preposterous. The 
foremost reason for thinking this is that goodness is an evaluative concept, and there is 
nothing evaluative in the fulfilment of an appetite simply as such. To be sure, certain 
appetites – those in the organic world – are such that their fulfilment is good, but this is 
precisely because they are certain species of appetites – vegetative in the case of plants, 
sensitive in the case of animals, and rational in the case of humans. When a plant’s appetite 
for water is satisfied, that is good for it. When an animal’s appetite for exercise is fulfilled, 
that is good for it. When a person’s appetite for knowledge is satisfied, that too is good for 
her. Yes, it will be said, certain tendencies in living beings, when fulfilled, are good. But how 
can this remotely apply to the non-living world without involving an illicit teleologisation of 
that for which there is no such thing as a telos? 
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Recall that I have not used the terms ‘purpose’ or ‘telos’ thus far. They could be 
used consistently with the position I defend, but both terms have a such a deep-seated 
connotation of deliberation or intention that to use them without extra qualification would 
obfuscate rather than clarify. Indeed, the term ‘intention’ itself has been transformed from the 
scholastic ‘intendit’ as used by Aquinas to the essentially psychological meaning we now 
exclusively give it. It is hard to break out of the psychologisation of fulfilment by appealing 
to terms that connote yet more psychology. Similarly, it is hard to break out of the 
organicisation of fulfilment (to employ a barbarism) by employing terms now used 
exclusively in the description of living things.
8
 
To get clear on inorganic fulfilment, then, we have to bracket off any thinking that 
applies to the world of living things. Goodness, I submit, is not ipso facto sidelined. To see 
why, let us look at the simple idea of instantiation.
9
 You are walking with your child through 
the forest and come across a rough triangular shape naturally etched into the bark of a tree. 
You might say, ‘That’s a good example of a triangle’. Now, you are not trying to teach the 
child how to draw a triangle; suppose he already knows how to do that. So there is no 
question of the triangle’s being good for the purpose of teaching the child how to draw one. 
A fortiori you are not trying to teach the child how to recognize a triangle, since if he can 
draw one he can recognize one. You are just making an observation: this is a pretty good 
instance of a triangle. There need not be any purpose in the observation beyond that of 
communicating some information (and remarking, perhaps, on the wonders of natural 
simulacra): but that can’t be the purpose for which you apply the term ‘good’, as though the 
triangle is a good one for the purpose of making the observation that the triangle is a good 
one. So in what way is the triangle good? It is simply a good instance of that abstract shape. 
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Does this essentially involve evaluation? Of course: you are evaluating the triangle 
for its approximation to the abstract shape, for how well it fits that shape. The ‘well’ and the 
‘fit’ go hand in hand: the instance simply could not fit the abstract shape without doing so 
well (or badly). But there is nothing psychological in the evaluation itself, even though the 
process of making an evaluation is psychological. An objection will be raised immediately: 
the triangle is evaluated as good for a naturally-occurring one – as far as the triangles nature 
produces are concerned. But this need not be. It might be so accurate that it would have been 
good no matter how produced – even by the best technology available. It might be an 
extremely good example of a triangle. But don’t you have to have some hypothetical purpose 
in mind? When you say the triangle is good, you might mean that if the child did want to 
know what a triangle looked like, that’s what you could show him. Or that the triangle is 
good for a whole range of possible purposes – instruction, gross measurement, calibration, 
and so on – but if pressed you would agree it was not good for, say, atomic-scale 
measurement or precise prediction of some planetary alignment. 
It is not clear to me how an object can be actually good for a counterfactual but non-
actual purpose; surely it is only counterfactually good for a counterfactual purpose? In other 
words, if you wanted to teach the child what triangles looked like, the one in the tree would 
be a good example to show him. But that doesn’t make it a good triangle. The critic may 
retort ‘exactly so’ – that’s the point. If that is the point, though, then the critic, to be 
consistent, ought to deny that there is a triangle etched into the tree at all. For if he accepts 
that there is a triangle, he must accept that the shape satisfies certain criteria. If he accepts 
this, he must accept that these criteria are satisfied more or less exactly. But that is just what 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ mean here – that the shape satisfies the criteria for being a triangle more or 
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less closely, more or less well. So the critic should deny that the shape actually satisfies any 
criteria; so he should deny outright that the shape is a triangle. But then, by parity of 
reasoning, he should deny that it is a member of any species of the genus polygon. Yet 
nothing can be a member of a genus without being a member of some species of that genus. 
So he must deny he sees a polygon at all. In the vernacular, he must deny he sees a shape. 
And that is incredible. 
Might the critic insist, rather, that an object can be actually good for a merely 
counterfactual purpose? There are at least two problems with this view. One concerns the 
content of the counterfactual. Suppose the critic says: 
(C) Triangle T is goodF =df if you wanted to do F, it would be good to use T. 
This will not do, since ‘good’ appears in the definiens. That ‘goodF’, i.e. ‘good relative to 
some function F’ (such as teaching a child what triangles look like) is defined in terms of an 
unindexed ‘good’ does not help; indeed, it only makes the analysis more mysterious, since 
what does the unindexed ‘good’ mean? Suppose one says that it means something like 
‘advisable’. But doesn’t ‘advisable’ in this context just mean ‘good to do’? So the critic will 
not make much progress there. Moreover, it might not be advisable to use T: maybe T is at 
the top of a very high tree beyond the sight of a small child; maybe the tree is about to 
collapse; perhaps, if you were to try to teach the child about triangles using T, an evil demon 
inflicted temporary blindness on you both. The latter sort of case makes trouble for any 
definition employing purely non-evaluative terms, such as one stating that the probability of 
learning to recognize triangles given that one is exposed to the shape in the tree is higher than 
if one is not. There is a sense in which the evil demon scenario makes it the case that the tree 
exemplar is not good for teaching anyone about triangles, but not a sense that has anything to 
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do with the geometrical properties of that exemplar. We are familiar with the problems of 
counterfactual analyses in general, and rectifying them is a cottage industry in metaphysics 
and semantics. We have, for our purposes, more than enough evidence to shift the burden 
onto the critic to show how such an analysis would work. 
More important, however, is the problem that a counterfactual analysis such as (C) 
gets the order of explanation the wrong way around. It’s not that the triangle is actually good 
in virtue of its being good to use to teach a child how to recognize triangles. Rather, it’s good 
to use the triangle to teach the child how to recognize triangles in virtue of its being a good 
triangle pure and simple. This object has to meet the criteria of triangularity to some 
appropriate degree before it can be good for any purpose, hypothetical or actual, that involves 
triangles qua triangles. But ‘appropriate’ cannot mean, say, ‘for the purpose of teaching a 
child how to recognize triangles’ because then all we would be saying – if our purpose is to 
teach children how to recognize triangles – is that the object has to meet the criteria of 
triangularity to the degree necessary for the purpose of teaching children about triangles 
before it can be good for teaching children how to recognize triangles. Or, to put it succinctly, 
if you want to teach a child how to recognize triangles, you had better use triangles! I cannot 
deny that this is a most wholesome and necessary strategy, but it does not tell me whether I 
should use that particular shape etched into that particular tree. The shape had better be a 
good triangle before I can confidently decide it is good to use for my educational purpose.
10
 
 
4. THE GOOD IN THE REAL: EXISTENCE 
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I have spent a lot of time on good instantiation simply to dispel the idea that 
goodness in the non-living world can only obtain in virtue of purpose. It is not essential to my 
case that this particular kind of goodness be ubiquitous or even common, although not much 
reflection is needed to see that good instantiation is indeed found everywhere. Note that my 
example was the instantiation of an abstract object. Abstract objects themselves are neither 
good nor bad. So I am confining this primary sense of goodness to the world of the concrete, 
or at least to those things that are not wholly abstract. Nor is every concrete instantiation of 
an abstract object good or bad, since there can be no good or bad instances where there is no 
room for approximation, for instance in the case of numbers or equations. It is hard to see 
how there can be such a thing as a good pair of apples
11
 or a good concrete example of 
Pythagoras’s Theorem as far as instantiation is concerned.12 It is also, for that matter, hard to 
see how there can be such a thing as a good electron or a good water molecule. There is an 
important project in working out how far good instantiation does apply in the concrete world, 
but not one I can pursue here. 
One thing to note about instantiation is that, contrary to what might be supposed, it 
is a kind of tendency. Although I am generally using ‘tendency’ and ‘disposition’ 
interchangeably, as indicated earlier, we can with propriety say that our tree-etched triangle 
tends to triangularity. We would normally say that it tends to look like a triangle – without 
implying any actual movement, behaviour, or manifestation of a disposition. But we also say 
that a curve tends towards an axis without implying anything about movement. In the case of 
the triangle, ‘tends’ means just ‘approximates’ or ‘fits to a certain degree’. 
In the more general, indeed ubiquitous, case I now want to consider, tendency is 
again not to be thought of dynamically, but it is still an example of goodness. What I have in 
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mind is simple continuation of existence in the concrete world. Existing things tend to 
continue to exist. By continuing to exist, they satisfy their tendency, and that is good pure and 
simple. How can that be? We need first to be clear that not every tendency involves a final 
state that results from a stimulus. We think of tendencies and dispositions as defined by 
stimulus-manifestation conditions: if salt is immersed in water, it dissolves; if a metal is 
heated, it expands; and so on. What ‘dynamic’ means here is that if something is done to the 
object, it behaves in a certain way. Now it may be that continuation in existence is dynamic 
in a different sense. The sense is not conative, as the more common term ‘persistence’ might 
suggest, which is why I will use the more neutral expression ‘continuation in/of existence’. 
Rather, it might just be that continuation in existence essentially involves continual changes 
in an object as it reacts to its environment. But even if continuation in existence is dynamic in 
this specific sense, we cannot debar it from being a tendency on the ground that tendencies 
can only manifest as the result of a stimulus: why could it not be that some tendencies are so 
basic to a thing that they manifest not only for as long as the thing exists but because it 
exists? Clearly there are some properties – generic spatio-temporal ones spring immediately 
to mind – that concrete objects have for as long as they exist and because they exist. Why 
shouldn’t some of those properties also be the manifestation of certain tendencies without 
there being a relevant stimulus and the correlative behaviour in response to it? 
We seem to have an immediate problem, though, if we take continuation in 
existence to be such a property – one that holds for as long as the object exists and precisely 
because it exists. We appear to be mired in a circle: how can we say that objects have a 
tendency to continue to exist because they exist, when the reverse must be true – that they 
exist because they have a tendency to continue to exist? We have to clarify further in order to 
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escape the apparent circle. To say that an object has the tendency to continue to exist because 
it exists is loose talk. Precisely, if it has such a tendency, it will be for the same reason that it 
has any other essential property – because it exists as a certain kind of thing. Since the 
tendency to continue to exist is, as I claim, common to all concrete objects, we should not be 
surprised that they have it because of the kind to which they all belong, namely, concrete 
object. So concrete objects have the tendency to continue to exist because they exist as 
concrete objects. Moreover, they do not exist as concrete objects because they have the 
tendency to continue to exist. The question why they exist as concrete objects looks like a 
request for a fundamental metaphysical analysis and here we might appeal, if we are 
Aristotelians, to the form-matter structure of concrete objects. But whatever we are looking 
for with such a question, the answer cannot be an appeal to some property or other of the 
object. To be sure, it is logically impossible for a thing to have the tendency to continue to 
exist without existing in the first place, but that does not mean its mere existence explains the 
tendency. So we do not have any explanatory or other circle here. 
What, then, explains the tendency? First I have to justify the claim that there is 
indeed such a tendency. The obvious reaction to such a claim is to assert that continuation in 
existence is just a brute fact. As Bede Rundle puts it: ‘no form of causation, divine or 
otherwise, is in general required to ensure persistence in being. […] [M]any things in the 
universe, as indeed the universe itself, do not have to fight for their survival, but, in the 
absence of forces which would bring them to an end, their continuation from moment to 
moment is in no need of explanation.’13 A couple of points about this particular passage: first, 
I am not going to discuss the role, if there is one, of divine causation, which is tangential to 
present concerns. Secondly, the term ‘causation’ has to be handled with care. Rundle’s 
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tendentious way of putting his point makes it seem that an explanation of continuance in 
existence appeals to some other object or property that causes, in some mechanical or 
efficient sense, the continuation in existence of concrete objects. Again, we do not need to 
subscribe to that. By appeal to the nature of concrete objects as concrete, if anything what we 
appeal to is formal causation: it is because objects are thus-and-so that they continue in 
existence. Thirdly, the term ‘fight for their survival’ is distractingly – and equally 
tendentiously – conative: something can have a tendency to continue in existence without 
fighting to do so. 
The main question is whether continuation in existence can be taken as a brute fact: 
can we happily stop at the thought that concrete objects continue to exist in the absence of 
forces that would destroy them? It is not an analytic truth that Rundle is asserting. He is not 
claiming that objects continue to exist until they cease to exist. He mentions forces, and is 
right to do so. It is not as though objects cease to exist under such a variety of circumstances 
that we cannot, even in principle, find anything common to them. They cease to exist when 
and only when forces act upon them. Why should we accept that as brute any more than if it 
were the case that all objects ceased to exist when and only when in the vicinity of objects 
twice their size? Isn’t there an interesting phenomenon here for which we need to account? 
Concrete objects are liable to destruction by the application of forces. This does not mean 
they have the tendency to cease to exist rather than the tendency to continue to exist: on the 
contrary, their tendency to cease to exist when subject to certain forces depends ontologically 
on the tendency to continue to exist in the absence of those forces. Nothing can cease to exist 
in certain conditions unless it already continues to exist prior to those conditions. But if a 
thing has a tendency to cease to exist in certain conditions – a specific disposition activated 
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by a relatively limited kind and range of stimuli – then it must have a tendency to continue to 
exist absent those stimuli. 
Suppose we said that salt has a tendency to dissolve in water but no tendency not to 
dissolve in the absence of water; it just happens, as a brute fact, that in the absence of water it 
does not dissolve. This would hardly make sense, since the explanation of its dissolution in 
water in terms of the breaking of sodium chloride’s ionic bonds appeals to the very 
phenomena that also explain why salt does not dissolve in the absence of water – the ionic 
bonds themselves, which in the absence of water are maintained. Similarly, the explanation 
of the ceasing to exist of some object – say, the evaporation of a puddle of water by the 
application of heat – appeals to the very same phenomena that explain why a puddle of water 
does not evaporate in the absence of heat – the amount of kinetic energy in the molecules. 
Now it need not be the case that the explanation of some object’s ceasing to exist in 
certain conditions must appeal to all of the phenomena that explain its continuing to exist in 
the absence of those conditions: it might appeal only to some phenomena necessary but not 
sufficient for continuance in existence. For a simplistic example that gives the idea, the 
tendency of some object to continue in existence might be explained in terms of both its 
intermolecular forces and some particular geometric property of those molecules, each 
necessary and both jointly sufficient for the object’s continuance in existence. But an account 
of its ceasing to exist might appeal only to the disruption of the intermolecular forces. Still, I 
would propose as a general truth that no account of ceasing to exist can fail to appeal to at 
least some of what also explains why a thing continues to exist. So the tendency to cease to 
exist must be explained, to some extent, in terms of the tendency to continue to exist. The 
former presupposes the latter. 
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Now the obvious apparent counterexamples to this claimed tendency to continue in 
existence involve phenomena such as radioactive decay and others that require a quantum-
theoretical explanation. Radioactive decay, in particular, seems to refute any such general 
tendency. If it does so, it means that decay demonstrates a tendency to ceasing to exist in the 
absence of any tendency to continue. We can, however, resist the alleged counterexample. 
Radioactivity is, at least according to quantum mechanics, essentially stochastic: it is 
impossible in principle to predict of any radioactive isotope that it will decay at some 
particular time. If you knew everything you could about the isotope and its environment, you 
could only ever give the probability of its decay at some time or other, as provided by the 
known half-life of any sample of such isotopes. It is, however, no part of my thesis that the 
tendency to continue to exist is a ‘sure-fire’ disposition, to use terminology noted earlier. 
Such a tendency can be possessed without its being necessary, as a matter of ontology, that 
the possessor exist (or not) at any particular time following its coming into existence. 
Indeterminism at the quantum level is not inconsistent with the tendency. Even if 
indeterminism were true across the board, i.e. even at the macroscopic level, this would not 
exclude the tendency to continue to exist. 
Maybe the objection from probability still has some life in it: for if an object has a 
greater than 50% probability of ceasing to exist at every time in its existence, does that not 
exclude any tendency to continue? But nothing can have a greater than 50% probability of 
ceasing to exist at every time in its existence; indeed nothing can have any probability at all 
of ceasing to exist at every time in its existence. The whole idea of a probability of ceasing to 
exist is of a probability of ceasing to exist at some time in the future. Consider radioactivity. 
Tritium, for example, has a half life of 12.32 years. Given a sample of tritium, after 12.32 
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years 50% of the nuclei will have decayed into helium-3 nuclei. At any time before 12.32 
years, the decay probability of any given tritium atom must be less than 50%. The same goes 
for all radioactive isotopes: there is no such thing as a zero half-life! Why not put half-lives 
aside and just consider a single object O: why couldn’t it have a greater than 50% chance of 
ceasing to exist at every time in its existence? Well, what is that supposed to mean? You 
cannot say something like: take N possible worlds (for some suitably relevant class of worlds 
and large N) in which O exists at some time T; in more than 50% of those worlds, O does not 
exist at T – a manifest contradiction, which is precisely why there are no zero half-lives 
either, nor any probability of any object’s not existing at every time during its existence. But 
we can make sense of the non-zero half-life of a single tritium nucleus in similar terms: take 
N possible worlds in which the nucleus exists at the beginning of each world, and each world 
lasts at least 12.32 years; in 50% of those worlds, the nucleus will have decayed into helium-
3 at the end of 12.32 years. 
So on pain of incoherence we have to say that any probability of ceasing to exist at 
some time in an object’s existence must be preceded by a lower probability of ceasing to 
exist, i.e. a higher probability of existing, at some earlier time, approaching a probability of 1 
for the time at which the object does exist. Example: I am attached to a radioactive isotope 
with a half-life H. The isotope is configured such that if it decays, a bomb goes off and blows 
me to smithereens. Since the probability of the explosion at H is 50%, at any time less than H 
it will be less than 50%, i.e. ceteris paribus there is a more than 50% chance I will be alive at 
any time less than H. The ‘ceteris paribus’ does not hide anything nasty: even if you rig the 
scenario such that multiple potential causes of my extinction are operative before H, there 
must still be a time before those causes are set up such that, whatever the probability of my 
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dying at some time at which the whole scenario is in effect, the probability is less, again 
approaching a probability of 1 at the time I exist. 
Forget particles: a train is approaching me and there’s a 99% chance it will flatten 
me at time T. Before T, when the train is further away, the probability must be less than 99%. 
Go back far enough, to before I was even near the track and the train was still in the station, 
and the probability of my death is reduced dramatically. The fact is, everything is going to go 
out of existence at some time – the probability of that is 100%. But we cannot even make 
sense of the thought without presupposing the tendency of things to exist before whatever it 
is that destroys them increases the probability of ceasing to exist to over 50%. 
So the appeal to radioactivity must involve another train of thought, to the effect that 
radioactive isotopes are intrinsically unstable – it is of their essence to decay.14 So whilst the 
probability of their existing before the relevant half-life expires is indeed greater than 50%, 
that does not entail their having any tendency to exist; it’s just a fact about them that the 
probability obtains. But their tendency, now conceived non-probabilistically, is quite simply 
to decay. They are inherently unstable – built to expire, as it were. In reply, I note simply that 
everything is built to expire: the second law of thermodynamics guarantees it. Whatever 
internal stability anything has is bound to be overcome, in the end, by the forces of 
corruption. Radioactive isotopes are not metaphysically special as far as that goes. 
Nevertheless, the objector persists, isn’t it significant that such isotopes have an 
intrinsic tendency to decay? True, most things are overcome by forces of corruption applied 
from outside, but unstable nuclei are all but impervious to outside forces (apart from high-
energy nuclear bombardment). Even if one can hold that many objects have an intrinsic 
tendency to continue in existence, which tendency is ultimately overcome by outside forces, 
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radioactive nuclei need no outside forces to cause their decay; indeed, QM insists on it. 
Decay has no cause so conceived. It’s just the nature of the nuclei to decay. In reply, it was 
no part of my original claim that ceasing to exist always requires the application of forces 
external to the object. Alpha decay is generally accepted as involving the overcoming of the 
strong nuclear force by the electromagnetic force;
15
 beta decay involves the overcoming of 
the strong force by the weak force;
16
 both involve internal interactions such that a force that 
tends to destroy the particle overcomes one that tends to keep it together. In gamma decay, 
the forces are indeed applied from outside – high-energy bombardment in the case of induced 
nuclear fission and collision in the case of fusion, though the mechanism of spontaneous 
fission is more like that of alpha decay. So whatever tendency to corruption a radioisotope 
may have, it still presupposes, ontologically, a tendency to stability and cohesion that must be 
overcome, whether internally or externally, for the corruption to occur. 
5. CONCLUSION 
If what I have argued is correct, then every concrete object is good in virtue of its 
appetites – including its appetite for continued existence. Goodness, then, stretches across the 
organic and inorganic worlds: it is one of the wholly general properties of concrete being 
(along with the quiddity and unity of beings, among the other ‘transcendental ideas’17). One 
might wonder: even if this controversial thesis is true, why does it matter? Why can we not 
begin an analysis of goodness with the organic world or some part thereof, where concepts 
such as life, growth and development, flourishing, sickness, and what we might call 
‘goodness-for’ have a grip? Whatever appetites salt fulfils when it dissolves in water, it is 
assuredly not good for it to do so, whereas when a living being fulfils an appetite, that is good 
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for it. If our ultimate aim is understanding goodness in human beings, ought we not to begin 
either directly with human beings or else, following Foot (2001), with the ‘natural goodness’ 
to be found in the organic realm? 
The brief response to this understandable puzzlement is that to do so would be 
effectively to identify goodness with goodness-for: there is no goodness other than what is 
good for some (living) being (or group of such beings). The problem with this approach is 
that it treats goodness-for as a simple concept, at least inasmuch as what is good in goodness-
for cannot be understood without the ‘forness’, as we might put it. Yet if we are to ground 
goodness-for in some phenomenon that is responsible for it – whether it be (and on this we 
can for present purposes remain wholly neutral) pleasure, the satisfaction of desires or 
preferences, the meeting of needs, or something else – we must appeal to a formal appetite-
fulfilment structure that constitutes goodness simpliciter. When something obtains that is 
good for an entity, some kind of fulfilment occurs: it is the good, in this broadest sense, 
whose obtaining is also good for certain more specific kinds of thing, namely living beings 
(and their sub-kinds). 
Yet once we identify an underlying, kind-neutral goodness that consists in the 
fulfilment of an appetite, we should see that it applies across the board, to both the living and 
the non-living. Once we bracket off the ‘forness’ in goodness-for, what is left is 
metaphysically no different to what we find in the inorganic realm – the fulfilment of 
appetites or, in alternative terms, the actualization of potencies. It is in this precise but wholly 
general sense that what salt does when it dissolves in water is metaphysically no different to 
what a cat does when it eats food or what a person does when they get married. Once we 
grasp this phenomenon, the place of goodness in the living world – particularly in the human 
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world which should be the ultimate target for any study of the good – is much easier to 
appreciate and to analyse. There are many mysteries in the way living things function, not 
least the special kind of causation that they exercise, what I have called ‘immanent 
causation’.18 That they act purposively in ways that are good for them is something of a 
stumbling block for attempts to explain the origin of life from non-life, at least as far as the 
available hypotheses are concerned. Yet even if we are forced to accept that the ‘forness’ of 
goodness-for is a phenomenon that emerges with, and is co-extensive with, the world of 
living things, we should resist (and are by no means compelled to conclude) that the 
goodness of goodness-for is to be similarly characterized. This would make an intolerable 
mystery of one of the broadest of metaphysical concepts. To regard it as gaining a foothold 
only at the level of the organic would be as odd as claiming the same to apply to equally 
broad and topic-neutral concepts such as truth and unity. Strange to contemporary 
philosophical ears as it may sound, the location of primary, non-moral goodness at a level so 
basic it straddles both the living and the non-living is a more accurate naturalism than 
anything that currently goes by that name. 
 
 
        University of Reading 
                                           
 
NOTES 
 
1
 The convertibility principle is found, for instance, in Alexander of Hales and St 
Albert the Great. Its most famous formulation is in St Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica 
(hereafter ST) I q.5 a.1 (Aquinas 1920, pp. 52-4). See further Aertsen (1985). 
2
 As well as Aquinas, see Duns Scotus, Treatise on God as First Principle (De 
Primo Principio): English at http://www.ewtn.com/library/THEOLOGY/GODASFIR.HTM; 
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Latin at https://archive.org/stream/operaomnia03dunsuoft#page/210/mode/2up) [last accessed 
23 Jan. 2014]; also Cronin (1930), pp.134, 214 and passim; Mercier (1916), p. 212ff. 
3
 See, e.g., Meditations (1641: ‘perfectiones’, 1647: ‘perfections’), with Meditation 
5 (Ariew and Cress 2006, p.35) being a good example; Principles of Philosophy I.23, I.37 
(Cottingham et al. 1985, pp. 200-1, 205). 
4
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason A599/B627 (Guyer and Wood 1998, p.567). 
5
 See, e.g., Glenn (1948): 188ff., reflecting the way Aquinas speaks of perfection in 
ST I q.4 (1920, p.45ff.) and elsewhere. Hence I am using ‘perfection’ gerundially, like 
‘perfecting’, rather than as a pure noun denoting the outcome or state resulting from 
perfecting, let alone to denote a state that is absolute and does not result from any perfecting 
(e.g. divine perfection). 
6
 I will use ‘tendency’ and ‘disposition’ interchangeably, though more detailed 
analysis of the topic would make it advisable to reserve ‘tendency’ for dispositions that are 
probabilistic, as opposed to deterministic or so-called ‘sure-fire’ dispositions: see for example 
McKitrick (2009): 190-1. 
7
 De Veritate q.22 a.1 (Aquinas 1954; ‘appetit’ and ‘tendit’ in the Latin). 
8
 Think of terms such as ‘flourish’ and ‘develop’. 
9
 The example that follows comes from Feser (2009), pp. 33-4, which I have 
modified and expanded. 
10
 What if our purpose has nothing to do with teaching children how to recognize 
triangles? Suppose we want to use the shape in the tree to make a mathematical calculation. 
Then ‘appropriate’ still cannot mean ‘for the purpose of teaching children to recognize 
triangles’, for we would end up saying that the shape in the tree has to be good for the 
purpose of teaching children how to recognize triangles before it can be used to make a 
mathematical calculation. While this might be true in some cases, in the vast majority it will 
be false. The same goes for any substitutions doing duty for appropriateness and some 
ulterior purpose: either what we end up saying about the triangle is a useless truism or it will 
almost certainly be false. 
11
 As opposed to a pair of good apples. 
12
 The latter may be in question if we are concerned with a concrete instance of a 
right-angled triangle; but the goodness question will be about the triangle, not the theorem. If 
the triangle is good, there is no room for the instantiation of the theorem not being good. 
13
 Rundle (2004), p.93. 
14
 This applies only to alpha and beta decay; gamma decay does not involve 
transmutation. 
15
 See for a simple explanation http://hyperphysics.phy-
astr.gsu.edu/hbase/hframe.html [last accessed 22 Jan. 2014]. For a more complex one, see 
Krane (1998), p. 174 and ch. 8. 
16
 See further Krane (1998), pp. 174-5 and ch. 9. 
17
 Aquinas, De Veritate q.1 a.1, Aquinas (1954). 
18
 See Oderberg (2013). 
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